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Abstract—Capability machines such as CHERI provide mem-
ory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide
security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The
C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by
following a principle called “pointers as capabilities” (PAC ).
Informally, PAC says that a compiler should represent a
source language pointer as a machine code capability. But the
security properties of PAC compilers are not yet well understood.
We show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC
compilers can provide significant additional security guarantees
for partial programs: the compiler can provide guarantees for a
compilation unit, even if that compilation unit is later linked to
attacker-controlled machine code.
This paper is the first to study the security of PAC compilers
for partial programs formally. We prove for a model of such a
compiler that it is fully abstract. The proof uses a novel proof
technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which is of broad interest
because it reuses and extends the compiler correctness relation
in a natural way, as we demonstrate.
We implement our compiler on top of the CHERI platform
and show that it can compile legacy C code with minimal code
changes. We provide performance benchmarks that show how
performance overhead is proportional to the number of cross-
compilation-unit function calls.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Capability machines and pointers-as-capabilities
In a conventional computer, memory locations are ad-
dressed using integers. There, a store instruction such as
sw $r2 n($r0) interprets the contents of register $r0 as a
virtual address (which is an integer), and adds n to it to obtain
the (integer) address where to store the contents of $r2. In
other words, the memory model of a conventional computer is
essentially an array of integers indexed by integers. Instead, in
a capability machine (i.e., a capability-based computer), mem-
ory locations are addressed using a capability. Capabilities are
a separate type of run-time values that carry more information
than just a memory address. They also contain bounds infor-
mation indicating a section of memory that can be accessed
using this capability, and possibly also other information such
as access permissions. The store instruction csw $r2 n($c0)
now uses a capability register $c0, and the machine will
check that the store performed by this instruction is within
bounds, and is compliant with the permissions associated with
the capability in $c0. If n is too big, or if $c0 only has
permission for reading, the store instruction will fail with an
exception. The hardware also implements run-time type checks
to ensure that integers and capabilities can not be confused,
for instance capabilities are stored in separate register banks,
and capabilities are tracked in memory by tagging memory
locations that contain a capability. Hence, capability machines
implement a more structured memory model where (somewhat
simplified) memory is a collection of independent integer-
indexed arrays, containing integers or capabilities, and every
capability gives access to a contiguous segment of one of
those arrays. This more structured memory model can be used
to implement fine-grained memory protection, and has the
potential to provide protection against many software bugs.
Unfortunately, this support for memory protection is only
useful if high-level software can use it, and manually mod-
ifying large existing code bases to adopt this memory pro-
tection is not practically feasible. Hence, ideally, compilers
should handle this automatically. Thus, capability machines
should be designed to make it easy for compilers of existing
languages (like C) to use the additional support for memory
protection. A recent example of such a machine is CHERI ,
a mature capability machine implementation that has its own
FreeBSD version and C compiler [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Many key
design choices in CHERI were made to facilitate the use of
memory protection in existing, large code bases. Specifically,
CHERI supports the pointers-as-capabilities (PAC ) principle,
which intuitively dictates that a compiler should represent
a source-level pointer as a target-level capability. To make
this convenient, a CHERI capability contains (among other
things): base and length addresses, and an offset relative
to the base address [5]. Such a capability represents a pointer
pointing to the address base+ offset, and that is valid for
accessing (using indexing or pointer arithmetic) addresses in
the range [base, base + length). Pointer arithmetic can be
implemented by manipulating the offset.
The following example illustrates how a compiler can map
C pointers to such machine-level capabilities.1
1 As a typesetting convention, we use a blue, sans-serif font for source
language elements and an orange, bold font for target language ones.
Elements common to both languages are typeset in a black , italic font.
Example 1 (From C Pointers to CHERI Capabilities). The
C compilation unit (below on the left) declares two module-
scoped variables and defines a function f() using one of
these variables. The assembly pseudocode (below on the right)
shows how a PAC compiler could translate the body of f().
1 extern void send_rcv(char∗
buffer);
2 char iobuffer [512];
3 static int secret;
4
5 void f() {
6 iobuffer[42] = ’X’;
7 send_rcv(iobuffer);
8 }
1 csl $c1, $ddc,512;
2 li $r1, ’X’;
3 csw $r1, 42($c1);
4 call send_rcv;
The default data capability register $ddc contains a capability
for the global data section. The compiler knows that the
variable iobuffer occupies the first 512 bytes of that global
data section. Hence, the first instruction (CSetLen, set length
of a capability) loads in register $c1 a copy of $ddc but with
the length field reduced to 512. The next two instructions
implement the assignment instruction of f(). Note that an
out-of-bounds access would be trapped by the hardware.
The final call instruction implements the function call in f
() (assuming a calling convention where the parameter is
passed in register $c1 ). Note that also all accesses to iobuffer
performed in send_rcv will be bounds-checked, since the
capability representing the pointer passed to send_rcv carries
the bounds information.
B. Security properties of a PAC compiler
Clearly, a PAC compiler provides security benefits. But
what security properties does it provide exactly?
First, the compiler provides spatial memory safety. Since
the bounds meta-data for a pointer is stored together with the
pointer address in a single capability value, it is straightfor-
ward to implement a bounds-checking compiler. For instance,
an out-of-bounds access to iobuffer in the example above will
not access the secret variable, but will fail instead. It is in
principle also possible to have the compiler provide temporal
memory safety. The compiler should then emit code to revoke a
capability when the corresponding memory region is freed, but
there are many challenges to do this efficiently. For instance,
revocation can be implemented by searching all reachable
memory and zeroing out any remaining capabilities for the
memory region to be freed, but this is clearly inefficient, in
particular for revoking stack allocated memory. Several papers
study approaches to efficiently achieve temporal memory
safety on a capability machine, both for stack [6, 7, 8] and
heap memory [9], but it is fair to say that achieving efficient
temporal memory safety for C is still an open problem. Hence,
we leave it out of scope for this paper.
But memory safety is not the full story. A PAC compiler
can provide stronger security guarantees. Consider again the
example above, but now under the assumption that the external
send_rcv function is not implemented in C, but directly in
assembly code. Now, we lose the guarantee that send_rcv can
not access the secret variable. An assembly level implemen-
tation can directly access $ddc. Hence, memory safety is only
guaranteed for complete programs: if all code in a program
is compiled by the PAC compiler, then all out-of-bounds
accesses will be trapped.
Since capability machines are designed to guarantee un-
forgeability of capabilities even at machine code level, a PAC
compiler can provide stronger guarantees than spatial memory
safety for complete programs. The main contribution of this
paper is that we show how a PAC compiler can provide strong
security guarantees for partial programs. In particular, for the
example above, the compiler we discuss in this paper provides
the guarantee that secret is inaccessible, even if the external
function is implemented in hand-crafted assembly code.
In order to achieve non-trivial security guarantees for partial
programs, the target capability machine needs to support a
mechanism to define separate protection domains within a
single process. For instance, CHERI provides support for
object capabilities [3, 4]. This makes it possible to put different
program parts in separate protection domains. CHERI mainly
uses the mechanism of object capabilities to compartmentalize
programs: it offers an API to programmers to run parts of
a program in a sandbox, a protection domain with reduced
privileges. The current CHERI compiler, however, does not
make direct use of the object capability mechanism: it can
only be used through the provided API by the programmer
who has to define and set up sandboxes. The PAC compiler
we propose in this paper, on the other hand, will automatically
set up a separate protection domain for every compilation
unit. Doing so allows the compiler to provide strong security
guarantees for partial programs. In addition to the guaran-
tees for partial programs against hand-crafted assembly, this
automatic compartmentalization can significantly reduce the
potentially dangerous impact of bugs in one compilation unit
on the operation of other compilation units, again without any
programmer effort.
C. Summary of our results
We study the security guarantees that a PAC compiler can
provide for partial programs. We prove a security theorem
about a simple model of a compartmentalizing PAC compiler,
and discuss its implications. We implement the compiler for
full C on top of the existing CHERI compiler, and we
evaluate the performance cost as well as the compatibility of
the compiler with existing code.
Our formulation and proof of the security guarantees of
PAC models PAC as a compiler from a very simple im-
perative source language with pointers, to a capability ma-
chine with memory capabilities and a very basic form of
protection domains/object capabilities. The security theorem
we prove takes the form of a full abstraction result [10],
which intuitively means that it is valid for programmers to
reason about the security of their program parts in the source
language. If a program part has a security property (such as
the confidentiality of the secret variable in the example) that is
valid according to the source language semantics (i.e., under
any interaction of the program part with other source language
program parts), then that property remains valid also if the
compiled program part is linked with attacker-crafted machine
code.
This is a very strong security property, and we only prove
it under some (reasonable) restrictions. First, some syntactic
restrictions need to be imposed on the (attacker-provided)
machine code. These restrictions can be implemented as a code
verification step by the linker. The main restriction we rely on
is that machine code should not directly access the program
counter capability, a restriction that is easy to check at link
time, and that guarantees that machine code can not confuse a
program part by providing it a code capability where it expects
a data capability.
Second, to make source-code-level reasoning sound even
when linking to machine code, we need to make some of
the machine-code level power of the attacker also available
at source code level, essentially forcing the programmer to
take this into account when reasoning about his program
part at source code level. Consider for instance the following
example:
1 static bool secret=true;
2
3 int f(int∗ p, int∗ q) {
4 if ((int) p ! = (int) q) return 0;
5 if (secret) return p[1]; else return q[1];
6 }
Function f() first tests whether its two argument pointers are
equal addresses. This equality implies that p[1] and q[1] always
evaluate to the same value (or both fail). Hence f() does not
leak information about secret.
However, a machine code level adversary can call f()
with two capabilities that point to the same address but
have different bounds information. In that case accessing p
[1] could fail, while q[1] returns a value, and f() does leak
information about secret. Hence, to prove our theorem, we
have to extend the source language to make pointers carry
bounds information. This essentially makes explicit exactly
what aspects of the target language programmers need to take
into account to reason soundly about partial source programs.
Full abstraction (FA) theorems are known to be hard to
prove, and the same goes for our theorem. Our proof adopts a
novel proof technique called TrICL (read, trickle) that relies
on trace semantics for both source and target languages. While
inspired by existing FA proofs, this technique is both novel
and of broad interest for secure compilation since it simplifies
trace-based proofs that are very common for secure compila-
tion results (as we describe later on). TrICL simplifies trace-
based proofs by providing a general technique for re-using the
simulation relation that is built for compiler correctness, and
for extending it into an alternating simulation relation for the
trace-based security proof.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• it is the first to state and prove the security properties of a
PAC compiler for partial programs. To do so, the paper
makes substantial technical contributions:
– the definition of a sound and complete trace semantics
for a C-like language (Section II-A) and for a language
with capabilities (Section II-B). Both languages feature
a memory model that allows fine-grained memory
sharing, which makes our results more interesting,
our proofs more challenging and, in turn, our proof
techniques more widely-applicable;
– the definition of a compiler between the afore-
mentioned languages that embodies the pointers-as-
capabilities design (Section III);
– a proof that said compiler is fully abstract. In this
proof, we use a novel proof technique called TrICL
(Section IV);
• it reports on an implementation of that compiler on top of
the C-to-CHERI compiler and benchmarks its efficiency
and compatibility with existing C code (Sections V
and VI).
Our contributions are followed by a discussion of our model’s
limitations (Section VII) and related work (Section VIII).
Most of the formalisation presented in this paper is mas-
saged for presentation, and many auxiliary lemmas as well as
proofs are omitted; the interested reader will find the full for-
mal details at https://github.com/capable-ptrs/tech-report. The
implementation of our compiler and the related benchmarks
will be made available publicly on publication of this paper.
II. MODELS OF THE SOURCE AND TARGET LANGUAGES
In this section, we introduce our models of the
source and target languages: ImpMod (Section II-A) and
CHERIExpress (Section II-B). But first, we explain no-
tation that is used throughout the paper including notation for
contextual equivalence.
Given execution states s, s′, and a small-step relation →
(with a reflexive transitive closure →∗), we denote by s→ s′
the judgment that state s executes and transitions into state s′.
Such a state s is not stuck. If on the other hand, no s′ exists
such that s → s′, then we say s is stuck. In our models, for
simplicity, we treat errors the same way we do stuck states,
i.e., we do not explicitly distinguish the event of an exception
with any special error state. An execution that reaches a stuck
state or that never terminates is referred to as diverging.
Programs and initial & terminal states: A program is a list
of modules, and a module is a list of functions. Linking of
a pair of programs is denoted by ⋉. We define linking to be
non-symmetric because it makes our security proof easier (In
Section VII, we discuss the reason for this non-symmetry). For
the sake of our theorem, we will distinguish two parts C and
p of a linked program C⋉ p as the context and the program,
suggesting that the latter is the program of interest because it
is the program that is or has been translated by our compiler.
But notice that each of the program of interest and the context
may themselves consist of more than one module (i.e., more
than one compilation unit). Our results do not assume any
restrictions on the number of modules that the program or the
context may consist of. As usual, only whole programs with
a main function can execute correctly.
The initial state of a program p is denoted by init (p). A
state s is called a terminal state when it satisfies the judgment
⊢t s.
If the execution of a program of interest p in a certain
context C reaches a terminal state, then we say the execution
converges (or instead say the program converges), and we de-
note this fact by C [p] ⇓ which is shorthand for the following:
∃s. init (C⋉ p)→∗ s ∧ ⊢t s
Now with the notation for convergence in hand, we define
contextual equivalence of programs as follows:
Definition 1 (Contextual equivalence of programs).
p1≃ctx p2
def
= ∀C. C [p1] ⇓ ⇐⇒ C [p2] ⇓
Two programs p1 and p2 whose termination behaviors (i.e.,
whether they converge or not) always agree whenever linked
and executed with the same context are contextually equivalent
(≃ctx).
A. ImpMod: An imperative language with modules, arrays,
and pointers
For simplicity, and in order to focus on the “pointers to
capabilities” aspect of the translation, we design ImpMod to
be low-level enough so that we do not need to worry about
extra correctness arguments that are otherwise pretty standard.
For example, ImpMod features only unstructured control flow
in the form of a JumpIfZero instruction. But it still features
functions and modules.
In fact, modules are crucial to implementing the “pointers to
capabilities” translation. They are the scope of module-global
variables and they are also used as a unit of isolation; i.e.,
1) every module gets its own data stack on which it stores
the frames of alive calls to its functions, and 2) every function
inside a module can access all the module-global variables,
whereas any function external to the module can only call the
module’s functions but is by default not allowed to access its
module-global variables.
For example, in Listing II.1 below, we have an example
module (Main) where variables iobuffer and secret (lines 4 &
5) are both module-global variables.
1 Module id: Main
2 Import module: Networking
3
4 iobuffer [512];
5 secret;
6
7 main() {
8 Assign &iobuffer[42] 4242;
9 Call read_secret();
10 Call encrypt();
11 Call send_rcv(&iobuffer);
12 Call decrypt();
13 }
14
15 read_secret() { ... }
16 encrypt() { ... }
17 decrypt() { ... }
Listing II.1: Example ImpMod module.
All of the main function2 and the secret-handling functions:
read_secret, encrypt and decrypt are defined in the same module
(Main), and thus can each access both variables (iobuffer
and secret). The function send_rcv in contrast is external:
it is defined in the Networking module which is presumably
untrusted. In line 11, the untrusted Networking module gains
access to the iobuffer. The Networking module, however, will
not gain access to secret through &iobuffer—so long as the
other trusted functions read_secret and encrypt also make sure
to not copy (a pointer to) the secret to the iobuffer. Any
attempt to increment and access the pointer &iobuffer beyond
the bounds of the array will get stuck. To understand how
we model this bounds check, we introduce the expression
semantics and the memory model of ImpMod.
1) Expressions and memory model of ImpMod: Expres-
sions are denoted with e.
e ::= Z | VarID | e⊕ e | e[e] | &VarID | &e[e] | ∗(e)
| start(e) | end(e) | offset(e) | capType(e)
| limRange(e, e, e)
Base expressions are integers Z and variable identifiers VarID.
On top of the base expressions, arithmetic expressions are
generically denoted with e⊕ e. Pointer and array expressions
are: 1) the array-offset expression e[e], 2) the ampersand
operator of the forms &VarID and &e[e], and 3) the star
operator ∗(e). Moreover, there are low-level expressions that
are necessary for reflecting the target memory model in the
source language (as mentioned in Section I-B): four getters:
start(e), end(e), offset(e), and capType(e); and a setter:
limRange(e, e, e). These low-level expressions operate on the
capability-based representation of memory addresses that we
explain next.
Addresses in ImpMod are represented as capabili-
ties. Thus, built into the memory model is a type
Cap
def
= {κ, δ} × Z× Z× Z for capabilities that is distinct
from integers Z. Hence, run-time values V are integers Z or
capabilities Cap. And therefore, a memory Mem : Z
fin
−⇀ V of
a program’s execution state in ImpMod can contain capability
values. The first field of the capability value indicates its type:
code (κ) or data (δ). The getter of this field is the expression
capType. The next three (integer) fields are respectively the
start, end, and offset of a capability. The start and end identify
the memory region on which this capability authorizes a (code
(κ) or data (δ)) access operation. The offset designates the one
address at which an access operation is performed. The offset
should be within range (checked by Rule Eval-star):
(Eval-star)
e ⇓ (δ, st, end, off)
st ≤ st+ off < end Mem(st+ off) = v
∗(e) ⇓ v
For space constraints, the full expression semantics is given
in the appendix in Figure 5.
2Notice in the main function on line 8 the use of variable iobuffer; the
syntax for l-values is more explicit than C syntax.
2) Commands and execution state of ImpMod: Commands
of ImpMod are denoted with Cmd:
Cmd ::= Assign el er | Alloc el esize | Call fid e | Return
| JumpIfZero ec eoff | Exit
An execution state s of a program in ImpMod consists of the
memoryMem, the stack pointers Φ of the module-local stacks,
the program counter pc, the trusted control stack stk —which
is shared among all modules of a program—and the memory-
allocation status represented by the next-free-address nalloc.
The space for dynamic memory allocation (i.e., the heap) is
also shared by all the program modules (like the trusted control
stack). The semantics for allocation and assignment are given
in the appendix in Figure 6.
B. CHERIExpress: An imperative language with modules,
and capabilities
Our target languageCHERIExpress is (like ImpMod) an
imperative language with modules. However (unlike ImpMod),
it does not feature variables, neither global nor local. Instead,
it only features “capability registers” and integers as base
expressions. With these capability registers in hand, the role
of the compiler from ImpMod to CHERIExpress is to
implement the operations on pointers by using operations
on capability registers. The memory model (as explained
already in Section II-A1 about the memory model of ImpMod)
is capability based. Through this capability-based memory
model and the capability registers, CHERIExpress models
a higher-level and simplified version of CHERI assembly [11].
1) Expressions and commands in CHERIExpress: Ex-
pressions are denoted with e.
e ::= Z | getddc | getstc | e⊕ e | inc(e, e) | deref(e)
| start(e) | end(e) | offset(e) | capType(e)
| limRange(e, e, e)
No expression allows fabrication of an arbitrary capability
thus exhibiting capability unforgeability. The getter expres-
sions getddc and getstc are the only base expressions that
evaluate to a capability value. Evaluation of the expressions
getddc and getstc immediately results in the current value
of the respective capability registers, ddc and stc.3
(Eval-ddc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ getddc ⇓ ddc
There is a third capability register that is also part of the
execution state, namely, the pcc register. It holds the program
counter capability which points to and allows the execution
of commands. This register is however eliminated from the
possible expression forms in CHERIExpress. This elimi-
nation is a simple way of enacting in our model the prohibition
(mentioned in Section I-B) on linking with contexts that
3The choice of the names of capability registers hints at their recommended
usage: ddc stands for default data capability [11], and stc which we defined
forCHERIExpress stands for stack capability. We use ddc as a capability
on the per-module data segment, and stc on the per-module stack.
mention the pcc register. Commands in CHERIExpress
are (modulo expressions) the same as commands in ImpMod.
Thus, instead of presenting here the full operational semantics,
we focus next on presenting the details of our PAC compiler.
III. ImpMod TO CHERIExpress: A
POINTERS-AS-CAPABILITIES COMPILER
Our ImpMod to CHERIExpress compiler J·K is a PAC
compiler. In this section, we present its crucial bits, namely,
the translation of ImpMod expressions to CHERIExpress
expressions. The translations of commands (denoted L·M) and
of modules (denoted J·K), on the other hand, are not surprising
due to the closeness of the source and target languages.
The translation of expressions *·+ : e → e, whose excerpts
are presented below, is indexed by the syntactic information
fid,modID (function id and module id) giving the scope of the
expression being translated, and β giving layout and bounds
of variables.
*z+_
def
= z
*e1 ⊕ e2+ fid,modID,β
def
= * e1 + fid,modID,β ⊕ * e2+ fid,modID,β
*&vid+ _,modID,β
def
= limRange(ddc,
start(ddc) + st, start(ddc) + end)
when β(vid,⊥,modID) = (st, end)
*&vid+ fid,modID,β
def
= limRange(stc, st+ start(stc)
+offset(stc), end+ start(stc)
+offset(stc))
when β(vid, fid,modID) = (st, end)
*vid+ fid,mid,β
def
= deref( * &vid +fid,mid,β )
*&earr[eoff ]+ fid,mid,β
def
= inc( * &earr+ fid,mid,β, *eoff + fid,mid,β )
*earr[eoff ]+ fid,mid,β
def
= deref( * &earr[eoff ] + fid,mid,β )
Translating expressions start, end, offset, capType, and
limRange is straightforward and, similar to *e1 ⊕ e2+, they are
homomorphisms (as expected [12]). Drawing on the transla-
tion of expressions we come again to the ImpMod program of
Listing II.1 where Line 8 is translated as shown in Example 2:
Example 2 (Translation line 8 from Listing II.1).
LAssign &(iobuffer[42]) 4242M
= Assign * &(iobuffer[42]) + * 4242+
= Assign inc( * &iobuffer + ,42) 4242
= Assign inc(limRange(ddc, start(ddc) + 0,
start(ddc) + 512),42) 4242
Note that the compiler uses the bound information that is
given in the text of the program in the declaration of the array
(Line 4) to introduce explicit curbing (using limRange) of
the ddc capability so that the resulting capability is of the
same size as the declared array size (512) and not bigger, a
curbing that in turn ensures that the assignment succeeds only
when the offset is within the declared bounds of the array. In
Line 8, we could already ensure the same by trivial static anal-
ysis. But more crucially, when static analysis is not feasible,
this automatic curbing introduced by the compiler ensures that
the run-time check that CHERIExpress provides is done
against the correct bounds.
In Line 11, the main function passes a pointer to an external
untrusted function (here no static analysis is feasible unless
the external function were trusted). Example 3 shows how to
translate Line 11.
Example 3 (Translation line 11 from Listing II.1).
LCall send_rcv(&iobuffer)M
= Call send_rcv (limRange(
ddc, start(ddc) + 0, start(ddc) + 512))
Again, curbing the ddc capability is achieved by means of
the limRange expression and it is crucial for the security
proof. Without such curbing, we would not be able to prove
full abstraction of our compiler. In fact without it, the untrusted
send_rcv function will have access to the secret when by
definition of the semantics of ImpMod it should not.
We next explain the end-to-end security guarantee that our
PAC compiler provides.
IV. PROVING THE COMPILER IS SECURE
This section discusses FA, the formal criterion we prove to
demonstrate that our compiler is secure (Section IV-A). Then
it presents a high-level overview of the proof (Section IV-B).
The proof relies on the definition of auxiliary trace semantics
(Section IV-C), and on a novel proof technique (TrICL)
that allows extending the compiler-correctness relation into
an alternating simulation relation that is indexed by a trace
(Section IV-D).
A. Fully abstract compilation, formally
Our compiler J·K is provably secure. The formal definition
that we choose for compiler security is standard [10, 13],
namely, full abstraction. A compiler is fully abstract when
it both reflects and preserves contextual equivalence.
Theorem 1 (The compiler J·K is fully abstract).
(i) The compiler J·K reflects contextual equivalence:
∀ps1, ps2. Jps1K ≃ctx Jps2K =⇒ ps1 ≃ctx ps2
(ii) The compiler J·K preserves contextual equivalence:
∀ps1, ps2. Jps1K ≃ctx Jps2K ⇐= ps1 ≃ctx ps2
The compiler reflecting contextual equivalence (condi-
tion (i)) means that whenever it produces two contextually
equivalent programs (Jps1K≃ctx Jps2K), then the source pro-
grams themselves must also have been contextually equiva-
lent (ps1 ≃ctx ps2). This condition (reflection of contextual
equivalence) ensures that the transformation J·K is non-trivial.
A trivial compiler might compile semantically different pro-
grams to the same output program. However, it would violate
condition (i) because semantically different source programs
are by definition not contextually equivalent. Notice that con-
dition (i) usually4 even follows from whole-program correct-
ness, namely, whole-program backward simulation (together
with some structural lemmas about linking and compilation).
Whole-program backward simulation is a standard [14, 15]
formal criterion for considering a compiler bug-free with
respect to a given source semantics.
Condition (ii), on the other hand, ensures that whenever
two source programs, ps1 and ps2, are not distinguishable in
the source semantics (ps1 ≃ctx ps2), then after compilation,
they should remain indistinguishable in the target semantics
(Jps1K ≃ctx Jps2K). Loosely speaking, what this condition
ensures is that no extra distinguishing power may be gained by
writing distinguishing contexts in the target language (i.e., by
attempting to distinguish the compiled rather than the source
programs) compared to writing contexts in the source.
B. Overview of the proof
To prove that our compiler is fully abstract, we prove
both the contrapositive of condition (i), and the contrapositive
of condition (ii). The former follows easily from compiler
correctness and its proof is fully detailed in the supplementary
material. The latter, namely preservation of contextual equiv-
alence, is depicted in Figure 1 and it follows from three main
lemmas (Lemmas 1 to 3) that all rely on an auxiliary (and
more manageable) definition of program equivalence called
trace equivalence (denoted
T
=).
Jps1K 6≃ctx Jps2K
Jps1K
T
6= Jps2K
ps1 6≃ctx ps2
ps1
T
6= ps2
Lemma 1
Lemma 2
Lemma 3
Contrapositive of (ii)
by Lemmas 1 to 3
Fig. 1: Visual decomposition of our proof of (ii).
Lemma 1 (Soundness of target trace-equivalence).
∀ps1, ps2. Jps1K 6≃ctx Jps2K =⇒ Jps1K
T
6= Jps2K
Lemma 2 (Compilation preserves trace equivalence).
∀ps1, ps2. Jps1K
T
6= Jps2K =⇒ ps1
T
6= ps2
Lemma 3 (Completeness of source trace-equivalence).
∀ps1, ps2. ps1
T
6= ps2 =⇒ ps1 6≃ctx ps2
The three lemmas above, put together as in Figure 1,
establish that the compiler preserves contextual equivalence
(the horizontal dashed arrow). One can intuitively understand
them as follows:
1) Lemma 1 ensures we can abstract contextual equivalence
as trace equivalence.
4Assuming the common ways of defining termination, and of defining
contextual equivalence to be equi-termination under all linkable contexts
2) Lemma 2 ensures (in the contrapositive) that the compiler
preserves trace equivalence.
3) Lemma 3 finally ensures we can concretize trace equiv-
alence back as contextual equivalence.
Lemma 2 is the hardest, so we dedicate Section IV-D to
explaining its proof. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 3 reuse
some of the ideas introduced in Section IV-D as well. While
the general approach (Figure 1) that we adopt—namely, the
use of trace equivalence as a go-between in the proof—is
not new [16, 17, 18, 19], we believe the elaboration here in
this paper of many details (especially the trace-indexed cross-
language (TrICL) simulation) is a novelty of this work. The
reason we come up with the TrICL simulation technique is
to provide a principled way of re-using the simulation relation
that is built for compiler correctness by extending it into an al-
ternating simulation relation for the trace-based security proof
(namely, the proof of Lemma 2). This re-usability advantage
might spark the interest of researchers in extending state-of-
the-art correctness proofs for realistic compilers into security
proofs (potentially by targeting architectures like CHERI ).
C. Trace equivalence
The reason we define this auxiliary program equivalence
called trace equivalence is to abstract over the execution steps
→ that are made by the target context. The way we abstract
is we characterize the behavior of a program of interest p by
a set Tr(p) of informative trace prefixes α that capture all
the possible interactions of the program p with any context.
Each trace prefix α is a finite list λ of labels λ. Two programs
p1 and p2 are then trace equivalent (written p1
T
= p2 as noted
earlier) whenever they have the same set Tr(p) of informative
trace prefixes (α):
Definition 2 (Trace equivalence of programs).
p1
T
= p2
def
= ∀α. α ∈ Tr(p1) ⇐⇒ α ∈ Tr(p2)
It then remains to understand how we define the set Tr(p)
for a program p. To explain that, we show an excerpt of the
labeled trace-step relation
λ
−⇀p that we define for our target
language CHERIExpress. Note that a very similar trace
step relation is defined for ImpMod programs too. The trace-
step relation relates two trace states and a label λ. A trace
state in CHERIExpress is written as (s, ς): it extends the
normal execution state s with auxiliary information ς , which is
the set of memory addresses shared so far (i.e., from the initial
state and up until execution state s) between the program of
interest p and the context. This auxiliary information is used to
define an informative trace label λ, which records a snapshot
Mem of the entire shared memory. Trace labels λ of both our
languages have the following forms:
λ ::= τ | X | call(fid) v ? Mem , nalloc
| call(fid) v ! Mem , nalloc
| ret ? Mem , nalloc
| ret ! Mem , nalloc
1) A silent label τ is uninformative: it abstracts over any
execution step that is internal to either the program or
the context.
2) A termination labelX indicates a terminal execution state
was reached. (Once a X appears, it re-appears in all next
trace positions.)
3) An input call label call(fid) v ? Mem , nalloc indicates
that at an execution state where the shared memory was
Mem , and the allocator status was nalloc, the context
called the program’s function fid with the list of values
v as arguments.
4) An output call label call(fid) v ! Mem, nalloc is similar
except now in the opposite direction: the program called
the context’s function fid .
5) An input return label ret ? Mem , nalloc indicates that at
an execution state where the shared memory was Mem ,
and the allocator status was nalloc, the context returned
control to a caller function in the program.
6) An output return label ret ! Mem , nalloc is similar
except the program was the one that returned control to
the context.
Fig. 2: Trace semantics of CHERIExpress (Excerpts) . The
trace-step relation is indexed with a program p.
(Return-to-program)
s→ s′ s.Mc(s.pcc) = Return
s.pcc * dom (p.Mc) s′.pcc ⊆ dom (p.Mc)
ς ′ = reachable_addresses_closure (ς, s′.Mem)
(s, ς)
ret? s′.Mem|
ς
′ , s.nalloc
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⇀p (s′, ς ′)
(Call-to-program-silent)
s.Mc(s.pcc) = Call fid e s→ s′
s.pcc ⊆ dom (p.Mc) s′.pcc ⊆ dom (p.Mc)
(s, ς)
τ
−⇀p (s
′, ς)
Figure 2 gives two rules of the trace-step relation
λ
−⇀p:
one where the label emitted is informative (namely, an in-
put return label), and the other where the label emitted is
not informative (τ ). Notice that the assumptions of both
Rules Return-to-program and Call-to-program-silent perform
a check on the program counter capability pcc both before
and after the execution step (i.e., in states s and s′). If this
capability value is changed with respect to the program-of-
interest’s code memory (p.Mc) by the execution step, then
this indicates that control went into (or out of) the program of
interest p. We call such a change of control with respect to
the program of interest a border-crossing action, and we give
it an informative label that records the memory snapshot and
that updates the auxiliary information (computing ς ′). If on the
other hand, the capability value in pcc is not changed (with
respect to p.Mc) by the execution step, then this indicates
no interesting change of control took place. We call such an
uninteresting action an internal action (i.e., internal to either
the program p or to the context), and give it the uninformative
label (τ ).
All uninformative labels (τ ) are eventually dropped, and
we concatenate only the informative labels into a trace prefix
α. These technicalities (all worked out in the supplementary
material) are mostly inspired by process calculi [20]. Also,
the idea of a trace label containing a shared-memory dump,
and of the auxiliary information ς recording a summary of the
shared addresses is inspired by Laird’s [21] trace semantics
for a lambda calculus with general references.
One key result of the choice of these ?- and !- decorated
trace labels, is that the trace prefixes formed by the concatena-
tion of the non-silent labels are alternating. By alternating, we
mean that the decorators “?” for input and “!” for output occur
alternately on the trace prefix. This is true of any trace prefix
α in the set of traces Tr(p) of a program p in both our target
language CHERIExpress and the source one ImpMod:
Fact 1 (Traces are alternating). α ∈ Tr(p) =⇒ α ∈ AltX∗
where Alt
def
= (
•
?|ǫ) (
•
!
•
?)∗ (
•
!|ǫ) and
•
? is the set of ?-
decorated labels, and similarly for
•
!.5
D. Using TrICL simulation to prove that our PAC compiler
preserves trace equivalence
Having introduced how our auxiliary trace semantics works,
we return back to Lemma 2, which states (in the contraposi-
tive) that our compiler preserves trace equivalence. Our way to
prove this lemma is to reduce it to the following two lemmas
by unfolding Definition 2:
Lemma 4 (No trace is omitted by compilation).
∀α, ps. α ∈ Tr(ps) =⇒ α ∈ Tr(JpsK)
Lemma 5 (No trace is added by compilation).
∀α, ps. α ∈ Tr(ps) ⇐= α ∈ Tr(JpsK)
The first (Lemma 4) follows easily by lifting the compiler
forward-simulation result (which we prove about the execution
steps) to trace steps. The second lemma (Lemma 5), however,
is a bit involved, and requires extending the compiler forward-
and backward- simulation relation into an alternating cross-
language relation, namely TrICL, that is indexed by an exe-
cution trace. The alternation of the TrICL simulation relation
relies on Fact 1 about the alternation of traces.
To understand how the proof of Lemma 5 works, we first
illustrate how an example trace prefix α emitted by an example
compilation would look like. Example 4 portrays a trace
prefix that is emitted by the compiled version of the example
ImpMod module of Listing II.1 (with indications of each part
of the action). For simplicity, we take our program of interest
to be this singleton list of modules. In general, a program of
interest can consist of many modules.
5The ∗ in X∗ is because a terminal state loops forever in our model.
Example 4 (Trace prefix of the compilation of the program
in Listing II.1).
call
fid︷ ︸︸ ︷
(send_rcv)
v︷ ︸︸ ︷
[(δ, σ, σ + 512, 0)] !
[σ 7→ 0, . . . , σ + 42 7→ 4242, . . . , σ + 511 7→ 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mem
, −1︸︷︷︸
nalloc
:: ret ?
︷ ︸︸ ︷
[σ 7→ 0, . . . , σ + 42 7→ 0, . . . , σ + 511 7→ 0],
︷︸︸︷
−1
In the example, the compilation of the first three commands
generates silent steps, which are dropped from traces and
therefore not shown. Then the two non-silent labels illus-
trate the two cases of the proof of the alternating TrICL
simulation:
1) the function call on Line 11 is border crossing, so its com-
pilation emits a non-silent label, namely, an output call
label which contains the callee function id (send_rcv ),
the argument to the call (the δ-capability representing the
pointer &iobuffer), the direction of the call (! denoting
output, i.e., program-to-context), a dump of the memory
shared so far (namely, the contents of the array ioubuffer
), and the value −1 denoting the first heap address (the
heap grows towards negative addresses).
2) the target context (in which our compiled program ex-
ecutes) returns control to the program after zeroing out
the contents of the shared memory, emitting the input
return label that is shown last in Example 4.
Notice that the goal from Lemma 5 is to show that exactly
the given “target” trace prefix of Example 4 can be emitted
by the source program (in some source context).
We show in Listing IV.1 a source context that (when linked
with the program in Listing II.1) emits the trace in Example 4.
1 Module id: Networking
2 Import module: HelperBackTranslation
3
4 current_trace_idx;
5
6 send_rcv(iob_ptr) {
7 Call readAndIncrementTraceIdx(&current_trace_idx);
8 Call saveArgs_send_rcv_1(iob_ptr);
9 Call saveSnapshot_0();
10 Call doAllocations_1();
11 Call mimicMemory_1();
12 Return;
13 }
14 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
15 Module id: HelperBackTranslation
16
17 current_trace_idx;
18 arg_store_0_send_rcv_0;
19 snapshot_0_σ;
20 ...
21 snapshot_0_σ + 511;
22
23 mimicMemory_1() {
24 Assign ∗(arg_store_0_send_rcv_0[0]) 0;
25 ...
26 Assign ∗(arg_store_0_send_rcv_0[511]) 0;
27 Return;
28 }
29 ...
Listing IV.1: Example back-translation (simplified excerpt):
An ImpMod context emulating the trace of Example 4.
The emulating context consists of two modules,
Networking, which implements the API function send_rcv,
and HelperBackTranslation, which implements helper
functions and maintains metadata. We show just one example
of such a helper function, namely mimicMemory_1().
mimicMemory_1() is called (on Line 11) by send_rcv(), so
that the former zeroes out the IO buffer. The way the IO
buffer is accessible at all by mimicMemory_1() is through the
pointer stored in the global variable arg_store_0_send_rcv_0
(Line 18). This pointer would have been stored (not shown)
by the function call saveArgs_send_rcv_1(iob_ptr); on
Line 8.
We briefly explain what each helper function does. First,
notice that given a finite trace prefix, the context that em-
ulates this trace prefix defines a set of helper functions
per trace label. The index of the corresponding trace label
appears in the identifier of a helper function (for example,
mimicMemory_1(), and saveSnapshot_0()).
To explain the helper functions, we follow the body of
send_rcv(iob_ptr) line by line. In the beginning, the call to
readAndIncrementTraceIdx keeps track of the current position
in the trace. This knowledge of the current position in the
trace is not used in our toy example, but it would be used
if the API function (send_rcv in this case) were called at
more than one trace position; at each trace position, we would
use this knowledge to call the corresponding helper functions
(e.g., mimicMemory_3() instead of mimicMemory_1(), which
would carbon copy to the shared memory the values that
appear in trace position 3 instead of 1).
Next, on Line 8, we store the pointer iob_ptr in a global
variable in the HelperBackTranslation module (as explained
above). The reason we need to store it in a global variable
is that we may need to use it in a future trace position, not
just in the current call to send_rcv. For the same reason (the
potential future use), we save (on Line 9) a snapshot of the
whole shared memory in global variables snapshot_0_σ to
snapshot_0_σ + 511.
Next, on Lines 10 to 12, the actual emulation of the
trace action at trace position 1 is done. In our toy example,
doAllocations_1() would do nothing because nalloc in Exam-
ple 4 does not change. Then, mimicMemory_1() writes all
the values (the zeros) to the shared memory before send_rcv
eventually returns, transferring control from the emulating
source context back to the program of interest.
The “vertical gap” challenge and how the TrICL
relation solves it: Notice two main differences between the
internal behavior of the emulating source context (that we
explained above) and the behavior of the target context:
(i) the specific sequence of updates to the shared memory
(before returning to the program of interest), and
(ii) the sequence of internal function calls (before returning
to the program of interest)
These two differences mean that respectively the memory and
the trusted call stack do not remain in sync (between the
emulating source context and the given target context). We call
this lack of sync between the execution states of the source
and target contexts the vertical gap challenge.
The vertical gap is a challenge we face when attempting
to define a cross-language relation between the given target
execution and its emulating source execution. Notice that by
defining the traces to capture only the observable behavior
(and not the internal execution) of the program/context, we
have created this vertical gap. However, the reason we defined
the traces this way is we want to allow more freedom to
what the back-translation function is rather than restricting
this function to be the “inverse-compilation” function (because
such a restriction would propagate assumptions that weaken
our threat model, assumptions that would require a target
context be only a context resulting from compilation).
Having acknowledged that the vertical gap is an inherent
challenge of our threat model and of the nature of our
languages (the languages that, unlike prior work [16, 17,
18, 22, 23], allow fine-grained memory sharing), we designed
the TrICL relation, which solves the vertical gap by relying
on an alternating strong/weak similarity, and by introducing a
mediator execution.
The TrICL relation is defined in terms of strong (≈)
and weak (∼) similarities, and in terms of the relation for
whole-program compiler-correctness (∼=p). That TrICL reuses
the compiler-correctness relation (∼=p) is one of the main
advantages of TrICL.
Definition 3 (Trace-Indexed Cross-Language (TrICL) alter-
nating simulation relation).
TrICL (semu, smed, sgiven, ς)α,i,p
def
=
semu ∼=p smed
∧ emulate_invariants (semu)α,i,p
∧ α(i) ∈
•
! =⇒ (smed, ς) ≈JpK (sgiven, ς)
∧ α(i) ∈
•
? =⇒ (smed, ς) ∼JpK (sgiven, ς)
The TrICL relation helps us prove Lemma 5 because
we can rely on the fact that TrICL satisfies the following
alternating backward-simulation condition:
Lemma 6 (TrICL step-wise alternating backward-simulation).
α ∈ Alt ∧
TrICL (semu, smed, sgiven, ς)α,i,p ∧
(sgiven, ς) ⇀
α(i)
−−⇀JpK (s
′
given, ς
′)
=⇒
∃s′emu, s
′
med.
(semu, ς) ⇀
α(i)
−−⇀p (s
′
emu, ς
′) ∧
(smed, ς) ⇀
α(i)
−−⇀JpK (s
′
med, ς
′) ∧
TrICL
(
s′emu, s
′
med, s
′
given, ς
′
)
α,i+1,p
Observe that the TrICL relation is a ternary6 relation
between two target states and a source state:
6The auxiliary information ς is considered part of the three trace-states,
hence we do not count it in the arity, and only count the three trace-states.
1) the source state, which comes from the execution of
Cemu[p], which is the program of interest p linked with the
emulating source context Cemu (Listing IV.1 is an example
Cemu),
2) the first target state, namely, the mediator state, which
comes from the execution of JCemuK[JpK], which is the
translation of both the program of interest and the
emulating context, and
3) the second target state, namely, the given state, which
comes from the execution of Cgiven[JpK], which is the
translation of the program of interest, linked with a target
context.
TrICL introduces a “mediator” execution (state smed) be-
tween the execution of the back-translated source context (state
semu), and the execution of the given target context (state
sgiven). This mediator execution enables us to conveniently
re-use both compiler backward- and forward- simulations. (In
Definition 3 above, notice that independently of the decorator/-
parity of the label α(i), we need in Lemma 6 to re-establish
the compiler correctness relation (∼=p). There is where we in
one case need compiler backward-simulation and in the other
forward-simulation).
TrICL helped us solve the vertical gap because it reduced
the lack of sync problem between semu and sgiven to a
lack of sync between smed and sgiven. The latter is easier
because it can be captured using a same-language invariant,
namely the strong/weak similarity relation. The key idea of the
strong/weak similarity is to characterize the strong relation
(≈JpK) by equality of the whole reachable memory, and the
weak relation (∼JpK) by equality of the unreachable memory,
i.e., the memory that is private to the program of interest
JpK. Because the memory private to JpK is by definition
untouchable by the emulating context, weak similarity is weak
enough to allow the (compiled) emulating context to do an
arbitrary sequence of memory updates (and internal function
calls). Weak similarity is however just strong enough to be re-
strengthened upon a successful emulation of the input (?) step.
(Notice from Definition 3 that weak similarity holds when the
context is executing—identified by the next label α(i) being
an input (?) to the program of interest).
Due to lack of space, we defer lots of proof details about
the strong and weak similarity relations to the technical report.
Most interestingly, we introduce there the idea of a successor-
preserving isomorphism and use it to define the stack similarity
relations that allow the internal function calls to differ between
the stack of smed and the stack of sgiven.
We focused in Section IV-D on the proof of Lemma 2
because we think it is the most interesting (compared to
Lemmas 1 and 3). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that
for the proof of Lemma 1, we actually reuse the idea of the
strong and weak similarity relations that we just introduced
above. Also, for Lemma 3, we use a construction similar to
the back-translation that we introduced in Listing IV.1.
V. IMPLEMENTING AUTOMATIC MODULE-BASED
ISOLATION FOR C USING THE CHERI INFRASTRUCTURE
The CHERI compiler already implements the PAC prin-
ciple, but it does not yet implement a module-based isolation
scheme like our ImpMod does. This section presents how to
implement such a scheme as a source-to-source C compiler
that annotates C programs with compartmentalization direc-
tives that, in turn, the CHERI system (including the CHERI
Clang/LLVM) [4] understands and implements. This provides
a way to automatically enforce our module-based isolation for
real-world C programs. The implementation of this source-
to-source compiler relied on extensions to libcheri that we
detail in Section V-C.
A. libcheri
In order to present the source-to-source compiler, we
first briefly explain libcheri [24], CheriBSD’s programmer-
friendly interface to the CHERI compartmentalization fea-
tures. Under libcheri, the isolated, compartmentalized parts
of a program are called sandboxes and libcheri is the API
for loading and invoking sandboxes.
CHERI ’s in-process sandboxes are objects which are repre-
sented in CHERI assembly using invokable object capabili-
ties [24]. The creation of these objects is the responsibility
of the programmer who groups functions into classes and
creates an invokable object capability of the class type. The
programmer does that by annotating function declarations as
cheri_ccall so that conventional function calls are replaced by
object capability invocations. Functions that are exported by
the current sandbox should be annotated with the cheri_ccallee
attribute. At run time, libcheri loads the executable images
from the file system and creates the respective object capabil-
ities. It is critical that, when the sandbox loading routines are
called, the program is in its initial state where it has control
over its entire address space as well as file system access.
Finally, constructor functions sandboxes_init must be added
to the modules that have call sites to external functions. These
constructor functions essentially perform a second linking
phase to correctly initialize the references that modules hold
to each other’s exported functions.
Listing V.1 below shows how these annotations are added
to (a subset of) the code snippet of Listing II.1.
1 struct cheri_object networking;
2
3 int iobuffer [512];
4 int secret;
5
6 __attribute__ ((constructor)) static void
7 sandboxes_init(void){
8 networking = fetch_object("networking");
9 }
10
11 __attribute__((cheri_ccall))
12 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(networking)))
13 int send_rcv(int∗);
14
15 __attribute__((cheri_ccallee))
16 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(main)))
17 int main(void);
18
19 __attribute__((cheri_ccallee))
20 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(main)))
21 int read_secret(void);
Listing V.1: Adding CHERI annotations to existing code.
B. Source-to-source transformations
Our compilation scheme maps each C module to a separate
sandbox, i.e., it assigns a CHERI class and creates a CHERI
object for each module. To do this, our compiler creates
a mapping from function identifiers to C modules, which
helps resolve dependencies in the next step. Then it traverses
each module’s AST and annotates every external function
declaration it encounters as either cheri_ccall or cheri_ccallee,
depending on whether the function is defined in the current
translation unit or is exported (more examples are available
in the Appendix Listings A.1 to A.4). As a performance
optimization over the ImpMod model, intra-module function
calls do not translate to object capability invocations. Instead,
they are ordinary MIPS function calls. This change has no
security implications since the module is the unit of trust.
The initialization of sandboxes required some extensions to
libcheri, which we now describe.
C. libcheri extensions
One hurdle in using libcheri for our compilation scheme
is initialization. libcheri exports two functions for sandbox
creation: sandbox_class_new, which instantiates the class, and
sandbox_object_new, which creates an object of a certain class.
As stated in Section V-A, the calls to these two functions need
to take place when the program is at its initial state with control
over the entire address space. We implement this by annotating
the initialization functions for all of the potentially required
sandboxes as constructor functions, which are invoked at the
very beginning before executing the main function.
Concretely, we extend libcheri with a new load/initial-
ization function, sandbox_chain_load(). This function is meant
to be called only once by an initialization module, which is
the only privileged part of the program (and hence can invoke
system calls and create sandboxes). The initialization function
sandbox_chain_load() loads the main sandbox, the module im-
plementing the main() function, from the file system and also
any modules that main depends on (recursively). It also creates
relevant object capabilities for every sandbox and places them
at the beginning of the sandbox’s data segment. As a result,
every sandbox has access to the object capabilities necessary
to invoke exported functions from other sandboxes. Extending
libcheri required considerable additions to the libcheri
code base including the definition of sandbox_chain_load(), new
versions of sandbox creation routines that support sandbox de-
pendencies and low-level macros that expose relevant sandbox
metadata to C.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Evaluating our module-based isolation scheme and its proof-
of-concept implementation is a matter of application support
and performance. In terms of support, it is important to
establish the viability of building and executing real-world
C applications under our scheme (Section VI-A) while per-
formance measurements are necessary in order to reveal the
overhead that our scheme introduces (Section VI-B).
A. Manual code changes
We ported four large open-source C libraries, and care-
fully chose a heterogeneous set of examples: zlib [25],
LibYAML [26], GNU-barcode [27], and libpng [28]. These
programs can be built using CHERI ’s PAC compiler, which
only translates pointers to capabilities, but the situation is
trickier after we apply our source-to-source transformations.
In particular, there are additional constraints in C code when
using sandboxes in CHERI and there is no guarantee that the
code will adhere to them and as a result, we encountered a
number of incompatible programming patterns.
TABLE I: Incompatible programming patterns
Software zlib LibYAML GNU-barcode libpng
Passed local ref 2 15 0 13
Extern global var 3 0 0 0
Pointer to ext fun 2 1 26 2
Other 0 1 1 4
Total 7 17 27 19
TABLE II: Porting overhead
Software zlib LibYAML GNU-barcode libpng
Lines of code 11255 12762 4657 33029
Altered lines 130 114 164 51
Percentage 1.15 0.89 3.5 0.15
Table I summarizes the frequency of occurrence of each
type of incompatible pattern that we found in each of these
example libraries. Table II summarizes the amount of code
change7 that we needed to make (manually) so that we can
compile and successfully run the benchmarks for each of these
example libraries. Overall, Tables I and II let us conclude that
the amount of code changes we had to make is rather small. We
discuss the three most common, and interesting, incompatible
patterns (in row order).
a) Pointers to local variables passed as argument to an
external function: CHERI prohibits passing local capabilities
when invoking object capabilities and this pattern will trigger
the violation. The solution is simple as a semantically equiv-
alent result can be obtained by moving the guilty variables to
the heap, either as a global variable or dynamically allocated.
This is a fundamental limitation of CHERI and is reflected
in our theoretical model. More on the issue of temporal safety
on capability machines can be found in recent work [6, 7, 8].
b) External global variables: Our compiler supports
global variables that are used in the same translation unit
they are defined in, regardless of their qualifiers. It does not,
however, support the declaration or usage of a global variable
that is defined in a different translation unit. Instead, the
importing translation unit may use a pointer to that variable,
7Note that the measurements come from the UNIX utility diff, where
modifying a line counts as two lines modified: one for deleting the original
and one for adding its replacement. Having said that, the ratio was very low
with zlib, LibYAML and libpng at a remarkable 1.15% and 0.89% and 0.15%
respectively with GNU-barcode at a slightly higher 3.5%
where this pointer is explicitly imported at run time (ideally
during an initialization phase by calling a getter function). Full
support would require additional work to the CHERI linker.
c) External function pointers: In CHERI , a C function
pointer is always compiled to an executable capability. This
can be problematic under our scheme in the case where the
pointee function belongs to a different module. In the easy case
where we can determine the pointee statically, we can do away
with the function pointer altogether and replace it with the
pointee. If on the other hand, the decision of which callback
function to provide is made by the provider only at runtime,
then a major re-factoring is needed. This re-factoring modifies
both the callback provider and the callback consumers. If the
callback consumer is however an arbitrary client library, then
our source-to-source transformation alone will not be able to
handle this without forcing the programmer to rewrite the API
(giving up function pointers) and consequently to change every
client library (i.e., every use of the API).
B. Performance
To measure the performance of our system, we carried out
benchmarks on the software we ported to our scheme. We
compared the secure, compartmentalized version of ported
software with one running in a single sandbox. This is
because unsandboxed execution has a significantly altered
executing environment w.r.t when sandboxes are involved, and
that heavily affects performance. The memory allocator is a
telling example, as the one used for sandboxed execution is
less memory efficient but much faster. So a single-sandbox
execution environment “evens up” the playing field yield-
ing measurements of the actual overhead. The benchmarks
were performed on a CHERI virtual machine (implementing
CHERI ISA version 5 [29]) running our modified version of
CheriBSD.
Before presenting the results, it is important to briefly
discuss the main factor that affects performance, namely
object capability invocation. As mentioned in Section V, our
compiler only affects declarations of external functions while
C statements remain unaltered. Consequently the transformed
executable should differ from the original only on the invoca-
tion method of external functions. The rest of the instructions,
representing the parts of the compiled program that are not
related to object invocation, are identical.
The performance overhead of object capability invocation
has been covered in earlier literature [4], measuring at about
500 machine cycles per invocation. This cost includes user-
space clearing of unused argument registers, saving and restor-
ing registers and kernel-space argument validation. Various
optimization techniques are being explored [3] and partially
implemented, as the latest published version of the CHERI
specification [11] supports non-exception-based domain tran-
sitions. However, the performance gains are either specula-
tive [3] or otherwise unexplored.
What this means is that performance boils down to the
number of external function calls in relation to the rest of
the program’s statements: A higher proportional number of
external function calls would translate to a higher number of
object capability invocations and a more pronounced delay.
This is, of course, a characteristic of individual software and
not of our compiler, thus begging the question of whether or
not the number of external function calls in real-world software
is sparse enough to guarantee an acceptable performance
overhead when compiling it under our scheme.
The benchmark results are summarized in Figure 3. Note
that GNU-barcode is designed to process bar codes of limited
size so there was no point in running benchmarks for it. Each
of the three remaining software demonstrate a distinct case of
overhead while all of them confirm that the number of sandbox
invocations is by far the biggest delay factor. There is also a
small, constant delay of about 0.2 seconds associated with the
sandbox loading routines.
The first benchmark was that of zlib found in Figure 3a.
The overall number of sandbox invocations was very low
throughout, irrespective of the size of the input data, ranging
from 43 to 441. This is reflected in the figure as the delay is
consistently minor.
The case of LibYAML proved very different. As it turns
out, the number of sandbox invocations were increasing in
linear fashion to the size of the input data. Although initially
the sandbox invocations were relatively low at 1482, they
reached up to 1523546. This is reflected in Figure 3b where the
execution time difference between the two versions increases
with each iteration, while the relative delay is consistently
between 35% and 40%.
The final case, libpng, was that of a program with a rela-
tively high number of sandbox invocations (about 125k) that
remains more or less constant irrespective of the input data.
This translates to a perceptible, constant delay throughout, as
one can see in Figure 3c.
Our benchmarks confirm that the number of sandbox invo-
cations is the most significant overhead factor. Moreover, each
sandbox invocation introduces a constant amount of delay (see
Figure 4). In this figure, the x-axis is the number of sandbox
invocations in logarithmic scale and the y-axis is in seconds.
We plot the absolute execution time difference between the
two versions for each of the three test cases. For zlib, the
plot is an almost flat line as the number of sandbox invocations
increases very slightly. The plot for libpng is basically a point
as neither the sandbox invocations or the delay changes in
any perceptible way. The most interesting graph is that for
LibYAML, where the delay increases in a perfect, linear manner
relative to the increase of the sandbox invocations (it is not
easy to see as the x-axis is logarithmic).
As stated earlier, the overhead being acceptable or not
for a particular piece of software boils down to the number
of external function calls (which are eventually compiled to
sandbox invocations) relative to the rest of the code. In general,
we cannot make any assumptions on that metric for existing
C software, so the question of viability of a certain piece of
software for our scheme can only be answered on a per-case
basis.
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Fig. 3: Benchmark results for zlib, LibYAML and libpng respectively. Blue lines represent the secure, compartmentalized
versions while red lines represent a single-sandbox execution. All x axes are in Log scale.
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Fig. 4: Execution time difference relative to the number of
sandbox invocations.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL AND FUTURE WORK
While we believe our work is a significant step forward in
the understanding of the security properties of PAC compilers,
it still makes some simplifications and assumptions that would
be interesting to remove in future work.
Treatment of memory management: Memory allocation in
our model is oversimplified and does not support de-allocation.
This simplification allows us to represent the state of the
memory allocator as just the next-free-address, and this is
essential in keeping our model manageable. To the best of
our knowledge, nobody has yet developed fully abstract trace
semantics for languages with a realistic model of deallocation.
In practice, this means that our formal results do not rule
out that compiled programs become distinguishable (i.e. leak
information) through the way they manage memory.
Other side-channels: Programs can leak information to
their context through a whole variety of other software-
exploitable side-channels. A context can measure execution
time of a program, or determine the memory locations that the
program has accessed through cache-based side-channels [30].
We do not model these channels. As a consequence, our
compiler also is not guaranteed to preserve resistance against
such attacks [31]. There is however recent related work that
specifically investigates how to secure compilers such that they
preserve side-channel resistance [32, 33, 34].
Possibly redundant load-time checks: Our compiler relies
on the linker/loader to perform some checks on machine code
before it can be linked. For instance, to avoid confusion
between data and code capabilities, the loader should check the
linked code does not access pcc directly. (In our formalization,
this is modeled by the absence of a getppc primitive.) While
some of these checks (like the one above) are justifiable from
a security perspective, some are just artifacts of the proof
strategy [35], and do not seem essential for security. One
example is that we impose that the context’s data segment
must be in memory after the program’s data segment. There
is no security motivation for this check; it just makes the
proof easier: the construction of the back-translated context
will occupy a data segment whose size is in principle larger
(due to meta-data) than the size of the data segment of the
target context that we are back-translating. This check ensures
that this increase in size does not impact the position of the
program’s variables in memory. A more complex proof (or
a different proof technique) might remove the need for such
checks.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
We presented a proof of full abstraction of the compiler
ImpMod to CHERIExpress which we called a “pointers-
as-capabilities” compiler. This compiler that we model should
be understood as a specification for compilers that target
architectures like CHERI . In addition, we have provided
evidence for the feasibility of implementing this specification
by reporting on a proof-of-concept implementation.
Our paper is the first to formally show that PAC compilers
satisfy a strong full abstraction property. But there is a rich
body of related work studying security proofs for compilers,
and compilation to capability machines. We briefly summarize
related work and the relation to our results.
A. Compilation to capability machines
The closest work to ours is StkTokens by Skorstengaard et
al. [8]. They also model and verify a compiler transformation
in a compiler that targets capability architectures. But there
are broadly two differences to highlight between their model
and ours. First, they model and verify a compiler transfor-
mation that implements a calling convention, rather than a
PAC transformation. Second, their compiler targets a linear
capability machine, meaning one that supports a special form
of capabilities which is subject to a certain non-re-usability
check that they assume is supported in hardware. Our model
does not assume this particular hardware support.
The calling convention that they implement relies carefully
on linear capabilities. Instead of CHERIExpress’s stack-
per-component design (for data stacks), the use of linear
capabilities enables sharing the same unified control and data
stack among all components including mutually distrustful
ones: the (untrusted) callee is handed a linear capability
on the stack. Then after control returns, by convention, the
caller checks for the existence of the same capability, thereby
detecting any (malicious or buggy) retention of the stack
access permission. In contrast, in CHERIExpress which
lacks linear capabilities, a trusted control stack is assumed
to be maintained in kernel space, thereby eliminating even
the need to hand out a capability on this stack to any user-
space program—hence, no retention of such a stack capability
by a malicious component is at all possible. For storing the
data part of the call frames, every component is allocated its
own data stack. The assumption that the kernel is responsible
for the control stack is compatible with the current CHERI
ISA [11] specification.8
B. Trace equivalence
Laird [21] gives a fully-abstract trace semantics for a func-
tional language with general references. Our trace labels for
CHERIExpress are inspired by this work. Laird relies on a
bipartite LTS in which nodes are partitioned between program-
configurations and environment-configurations (we used the
word “context” instead of environment). We, however, do not
build into CHERIExpress this explicit segregation between
program and environment configurations. Instead, we perform
a simple check on the status of the capability registers before
and after a step in order to decide the direction of a trace
action. Relying on this check, Fact 1 ensures that programs
interact with the context in precisely the desired alternating
fashion that a bipartition would have ensured.
The fact that we chose to use trace equivalence at all (to
characterize contextual equivalence) is inspired by existing
work that use it in proofs of full abstraction of compilation to
Protected Module Architectures (PMAs) and tagged architec-
tures [16, 17, 18, 22, 36].
8The current CHERI ISA also includes an experimental design with
support for linear capabilities.
C. FA Proofs that do not use trace equivalence
Back-translating traces to enable an easy cross-language
simulation relation is not the only strategy that has been used
in proofs of fully-abstract compilation (surveyed by Patrignani
et al. [13]). Several other proof ideas exist:
• While Fournet et al. [37] also use labeled transitions, their
full abstraction proof of the translation of an ML-like
language to Javascript is based on bisimulation. We, on
the other hand, require our TrICL (Trace-Indexed Cross-
Language) relation to only satisfy the coarser simulation
condition.
• In their StkTokens work, Skorstengaard et al. [8] use
another piece of machinery that does not require labeled
transitions at all: a logical relation with recursive worlds.
• New et al. [38] rely on a shallow embedding of the target
language (a λ-calculus with exceptions) into the source
(a λ-calculus with recursive types) at a dynamic type,
and use a cross-language relation that defines in multi-
language terms the contextual equivalence relation.
• Devriese et al. [39] coin the term approximate back-
translation to express the idea that the context that the
back-translation produces only needs to behave similarly
to the original (and unknown) context for a limited
number of steps, namely, the number of steps in which it
(the original context) terminates. They use step indexing
to represent in the cross-language logical relation this
approximate behavior.
When the target language is a subset of the source, as in the
work by Crary [40] on fully-abstract module compilation, then
full abstraction of the translation is a corollary of contextual
equivalence between the input term and the output term of the
translation.
D. Other secure compilation criteria
Abadi [10] was the first to promote full abstraction as a
criterion for compiler-enforced protection. Abadi motivated
the usefulness of full abstraction as a tool for understanding
the design of secure implementations of programming lan-
guages by giving examples of security violations introduced
by otherwise-functionally-correct implementations, and then
explaining how those insecure implementations are not fully
abstract.
Other criteria for telling the security of a compilation
scheme involve proving what class of hyperproperties a com-
piler can preserve robustly, i.e., when its code is linked
against arbitrary target code, as we do [23, 41, 42, 43]. For
example, if a compiler needs to preserve noninterference-like
properties, it suffices to prove that it preserves hypersafety
properties (noninterference being in the class of hypersafety).
Or, if a compiler needs to preserve integrity of compiled
code, it suffices to prove that it preserves safety properties
(integrity being in the class of safety). Unlike FAmost of these
criteria require reasoning about the trace behaviour of a partial
program. Since we have devised traces for our languages, we
believe we can explore which of these criteria is applicable to
our work as well.
Another active line of work [32, 33, 34] is concerned with
making sure that the compiler does not undo countermeasures
that the programmer of cryptographic libraries implements
in order to ensure protection against timing attacks or other
secret-revealing attacks. In this line of work, the guarantees
that are sufficient to capture the desired security intuition are
believed to be weaker but more domain-specific than the full
abstraction guarantee.
APPENDIX
A. Semantics of ImpMod expressions
In Figure 5, notice that rules Eval-arr-offset and Eval-var
are just de-sugaring rules. Also, notice that for simplicity,
expressions in ImpMod do not have side effects (the evalua-
tion context Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc that we introduce
shortly is actually read-only.).
The evaluation context for expressions consists of:
1) syntactic information about the program given by the
function definitions Fd, the declarations of module-global
variables MVar, and the layout and bounds β of all the
program’s variables;
2) load-time information about the program given by the
per-module data-segment-location∆, and the per-module
local-stack-location Σ; and
3) execution-state information given by the memory Mem,
the stack pointers Φ of the module-local stacks and the
program counter pc.
B. The TrICL proof technique
The TrICL relation is indexed by the given trace (α) from
Lemma 5, and by a position i on this trace.
The goal is to prove that the TrICL relation satisfies the
step-wise backward simulation condition (Lemma 6). But
first, we recall that TrICL is defined in terms of four main
relations/invariants:
1) the vanilla (whole-program) compiler-correctness rela-
tion (∼=p) between the source state and the mediator
state satisfying lifted forward- and backward-simulations
(Lemmas 7 and 8)
2) a strong-similarity relation (≈JpK) between the mediator
state and the given state, a relation that satisfies lock-step
simulation (Lemma 9)
3) a weak-similarity relation (∼JpK) also between the me-
diator state and the given state, a relation that satisfies
option simulation (Lemma 11), and together with the
strong similarity satisfying both weakening (Lemma 10)
and strengthening (Lemma 12)
4) emulation invariants about the source state satisfying
both adequacy (Lemma 13) and preservation by trace
steps (Lemma 14)
Notation: We write s ⇀
α
− p s′ to denote that s is a state
of the program-of-interest p (linked with some context), and
that α is a compressed trace prefix (i.e., with uninformative (τ )
labels dropped) that is emitted by the (multiple-step) execution
of s until s′. We write s⇀
α
− p s′ to denote the same about the
target language.
Lemma 7 (Compiler forward-simulation lifted to compressed
trace steps).
ss ∼=p st ∧ (ss, ς) ⇀
α
− p (s′s, ς
′) =⇒
∃s′t. (st, ς) ⇀
α
− JpK (s
′
t, ς
′) ∧ s′s
∼=p s′t
Lemma 8 (Compiler backward-simulation lifted to com-
pressed trace steps).
Fig. 5: Evaluation of expressions e in ImpMod. The evaluation relation ⇓ ⊆ e× V is defined on pairs of expressions e and val-
ues V. The evaluation relation ⇓ is indexed with an evaluation context Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc. The evaluation context is
used in rules Eval-amp-local-var, Eval-amp-module-var and Eval-star. Instead of writing Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc ⊢ e ⇓ v,
we abbreviate it as e ⇓ v.
(Eval-binop)
e1 ⇓ z1 z1 ∈ Z e2 ⇓ z2 z2 ∈ Z zr = z1[⊕]z2
e1 ⊕ e2 ⇓ zr
(Eval-arr-offset)
∗(&earr[eidx]) ⇓ v
earr[eidx] ⇓ v
(Eval-var)
∗(&vid) ⇓ v
vid ⇓ v
(Eval-const)
z ∈ Z
z ⇓ z
(Eval-start)
e ⇓ (_, z, _, _)
start(e) ⇓ z
(Eval-end)
e ⇓ (_, _, z, _)
end(e) ⇓ z
(Eval-offset)
e ⇓ (_, _, _, z)
offset(e) ⇓ z
(Eval-capType)
e ⇓ x x ∈ Z =⇒ v = 0 x ∈ {κ} × Z× Z× Z =⇒ v = 1 x ∈ {δ} × Z× Z× Z =⇒ v = 2
capType(e) ⇓ v
(Eval-limRange)
ec ⇓ (x, st, end, _) es ⇓ st′ st′ ∈ Z ee ⇓ end′ end′ ∈ Z [st′, end′) ⊆ [st, end)
limRange(ec, es, ee) ⇓ (x, st′, end′, 0)
(Eval-amp-local-var)
(fid, _) = pc vid ∈ localIDs (Fd(fid)) ∪ args (Fd(fid)) mid = moduleID (Fd(fid))
β(vid, fid,mid) = [st, end) φ = Σ(mid).1 + Φ(mid)
&vid ⇓ (δ, φ+ st, φ+ end, 0)
(Eval-amp-module-var)
(fid, _) = pc vid /∈ localIDs (Fd(fid)) ∪ args (Fd(fid)) mid = moduleID (Fd(fid))
vid ∈ MVar(mid) β(vid,⊥,mid) = [st, end)
&vid ⇓ (δ,∆(mid).1+ st,∆(mid).1 + end, 0)
(Eval-amp-arr)
&earr ⇓ (δ, st, end, off)
eidx ⇓ off
′ off′ ∈ Z
&earr[eidx] ⇓ (δ, st, end, off + off
′)
(Eval-star)
e ⇓ (δ, st, end, off)
st ≤ st+ off < end Mem(st+ off) = v
∗(e) ⇓ v
Fig. 6: (Excerpt) Small-step semantics of commands Cmd in ImpMod. The small-step relation → ⊆ s× s is defined on pairs
of execution states s. The small-step relation → is indexed with an evaluation context Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ and an allocation
limit ∇. The allocation limit ∇ is used in rule Allocate.
(Assign-to-var-or-arr)
(fid, n) = pc commands (Fd(fid))(n) = Assign el er modID = moduleID (Fd(fid))
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc ⊢ el ⇓ (δ, st, end, off) Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc ⊢ er ⇓ v
∀st′, end′. v = (δ, st′, end′, _) =⇒ ([st′, end′) ∩ Σ(modID) = ∅ ∨ [st, end) ⊆ Σ(modID))
st ≤ st+ off < end Mem′ = Mem[st+ off 7→ v]
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,∇ ⊢ 〈Mem,Φ, pc, stk, nalloc〉 → 〈Mem′,Φ, inc (pc), stk, nalloc〉
(Allocate)
(fid, n) = pc commands (Fd(fid))(n) = Alloc el esize
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc ⊢ el ⇓ (δ, st, end, off) Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,Mem,Φ, pc ⊢ esize ⇓ v
st ≤ st+ off < end v ∈ Z+ nalloc− v > ∇ nalloc′ = nalloc− v
Mem′ = Mem[st+ off 7→ (δ, nalloc′, nalloc, 0)][a 7→ 0 | a ∈ [nalloc′, nalloc)]
Fd,MVar, β,∆,Σ,∇ ⊢ 〈Mem,Φ, pc, stk, nalloc〉 → 〈Mem′,Φ, inc (pc), stk, nalloc′〉
Fig. 7: (Excerpt) Evaluation of expressions e in CHERIExpress. The evaluation relation ⇓ ⊆ e×V is defined on pairs
of expressions e and values V. The evaluation relation ⇓ is indexed with an evaluation context Mem,ddc, stc,pcc which
is part of an execution state.
(Eval-ddc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ ddc ⇓ ddc
(Eval-deref)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ e ⇓ (δ, st, end,off) st ≤ st+ off < end
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ deref(e) ⇓Mem(st+ off)
(Eval-inc)
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ e ⇓ (x, st, end,off) Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ ez ⇓ vz vz ∈ Z
Mem,ddc, stc,pcc ⊢ inc(e, ez) ⇓ (x, st, end,off + vz)
ss ∼=p st∧(st, ς)⇀
α
− JpK (s
′
t, ς
′) =⇒ ∃s′s. (ss, ς)⇀
α
− p (s′s, ς
′)∧
s′s
∼=p s′t
Lemma 9 (Lock-step simulation of strong similarity).
(s1, ς) ≈JpK (s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
τ
−⇀JpK (s
′
1, ς) =⇒
∃s′2. (s2, ς)
τ
−⇀JpK (s
′
2, ς) ∧ (s
′
1, ς) ≈JpK (s
′
2, ς)
Lemma 10 (Strong similarity is weakened by an output ac-
tion). λ ∈
•
! ∧ (s1, ς) ≈JpK (s2, ς)∧ (s1, ς)
λ
−⇀JpK (s
′
1, ς
′) =⇒
∃s′2. (s2, ς)
λ
−⇀JpK (s
′
2, ς
′) ∧ (s′1, ς
′) ∼JpK (s
′
2, ς
′)
Lemma 11 (Option simulation of weak similarity).
(s1, ς) ∼JpK (s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
τ
−⇀JpK (s
′
1, ς) =⇒ (s
′
1, ς) ∼JpK
(s2, ς)
Lemma 12 (Weak similarity is strengthened by aligned input
actions).
λ ∈
•
? ∧ (s1, ς) ∼JpK (s2, ς) ∧ (s1, ς)
λ
−⇀JpK (s
′
1, ς
′) ∧
(s2, ς)
λ
−⇀JpK (s
′
2, ς
′) =⇒ (s′1, ς
′) ≈JpK (s
′
2, ς
′)
Lemma 13 (Adequacy of emulate_invariants).
emulate_invariants(s)α,i,p ∧ α(i) ∈
•
? ∪ {X} =⇒
∃s′. (s, _) ⇀
α(i)
−−⇀p (s′, _)
Lemma 14 (Preservation of emulate_invariants).
emulate_invariants(s)α,i,p ∧ (s, _) ⇀
α(i)
−−⇀p (s′, _) =⇒
emulate_invariants(s′)α,i+1,p
Using the lemmas above, one can prove that TrICL satisfies
step-wise backward-simulation (Lemma 6).
C. Output of the source-to-source transformation
1 struct cheri_object main_obj;
2 static struct sandbox_object ∗main_objectp;
3
4
5 __attribute__((cheri_ccall))
6 __attribute__((cheri_method_suffix("_cap")))
7 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(main_obj)))
8 extern int main(int argc, char ∗argv[]);
9
10 int init(int argc, char ∗argv[])
11 {
12 sandbox_chain_load("main", &main_objectp);
13 main_obj = sandbox_object_getobject(main_objectp);
14
15 main(argc, argv);
16 }
Listing A.1: Source-to-source compilation output.
Initialization module init.c
1 struct cheri_object lib1;
2 struct cheri_object lib2;
3
4 __attribute__((cheri_ccall))
5 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(lib1)))
6 int f1(void);
7
8 __attribute__((cheri_ccall))
9 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(lib2)))
10 int f2(void);
11
12 __attribute__((cheri_ccallee))
13 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(main_obj)))
14 int main(void);
15
16 __attribute__ ((constructor)) static void
17 sandboxes_init(void)
18 {
19 lib2 = fetch_object("lib2");
20 lib1 = fetch_object("lib1");
21 }
22
23 int main(void)
24 {
25 f1();
26 f2();
27
28 return 0;
29 }
Listing A.2: Source-to-source compilation output.
Transformed main.c
1 extern struct cheri_object lib1;
2 struct cheri_object lib2;
3
4 __attribute__((cheri_ccallee))
5 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(lib1)))
6 int f1(void);
7
8 __attribute__((cheri_ccall))
9 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(lib2)))
10 int f2(void);
11
12 __attribute__ ((constructor)) static void
13 sandboxes_init(void)
14 {
15 lib2 = fetch_object("lib2");
16 }
17
18 int f1(void)
19 {
20 f2();
21 }
Listing A.3: Source-to-source compilation output.
Transformed lib1.c
1 extern struct cheri_object lib2;
2
3 __attribute__((cheri_ccallee))
4 __attribute__((cheri_method_class(lib2)))
5 int f2(void);
6
7 int f2(void)
8 {
9 [..]
10 }
Listing A.4: Source-to-source compilation output.
Transformed lib2.c
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